Arizona Supreme Court: State of Arizona v. Kevin Dunbar Case No. CR-23-0029-PR Filed June 18, 2024
ISSUES:
- Whether the denial of the right to self-representation at sentencing is subject to structural error or harmless error review.
- How to analyze a defendant’s untimely request for self-representation at sentencing.
DECISIONS:
- The Arizona Supreme Court held that erroneous denials of the right to self-representation at sentencing constitute structural error, not subject to harmless error review.
- The Court expanded the analysis from State v. De Nistor for determining when to grant an untimely request for self-representation at sentencing: Trial courts must consider whether denying the request would prevent the defendant from making choices about protecting their own liberty, in addition to the existing De Nistor factors.
Dissent/Concurrence:
Justice Montgomery dissented in part and concurred in part. He argued that:
- The majority needlessly extended U.S. Supreme Court case law on structural error to sentencing proceedings.
- The case could have been resolved by applying McKaskle v. Wiggins without remand.
- The record shows Dunbar’s Faretta rights were vindicated, so no error occurred.
Synopsis:
The Arizona Supreme Court addressed whether denying a defendant’s request for self-representation at sentencing constitutes structural error. The Court held that such denials are subject to structural error review, citing the importance of a defendant’s autonomy and dignity in criminal proceedings. The Court also clarified and expanded the analysis for determining when to grant untimely requests for self-representation at sentencing, emphasizing the need to consider whether denial would prevent a defendant from making choices about protecting their liberty. NOTE: The court limited its analysis to applying the United States Constitution, rather than article 2, section 24 of the Arizona Constitution, because neither Dunbar nor the State raised it.
Outcome of the Case:
The Arizona Supreme Court vacated part of the lower court’s decision and remanded the case to the trial court to reconsider Dunbar’s motion to proceed pro se, applying the expanded De Nistor factors.